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United States policy LIBRARY 
towards postwar Western Europe 
As his second term as President of the United States drew to a close, George Washington 
delivered his Farewell Address to the American people, in which he set forth the principles 
he believed should guide future policies. In speaking of the United States' relations with 
Europe, he stated: 'Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very 
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which 
are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate 
ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics ... Why, by interweaving 
our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the 
toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to 
steer clear of permanent alliances.' 
For almost one hundred and fifty years this 'avoidance 
of entangling alliances', as subsequently formulated by 
Jefferson, served as the basis of American policy towards 
Europe. When basic American interests were threatened, as 
in the First World War, the United States was forced 
to intervene in European affairs, but such departures from 
the policy of non-involvement were temporary: as soon 
as the danger had subsided, the United States attempted 
to extricate itsef from political developments on the Euro-
pean continent, as is illustrated most graphically by the 
Senate's refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty, which was 
regarded as imposing worldwide commitments on the 
United States. Yet only twenty-five years after the American 
Expeditionary Forces had been sent to France the United 
States was once again embroiled in a European conflict, 
and this time one of the first casualties was to be the policy 
of non-involvement in Europe. 
The general form of the United States' relations with 
postwar Europe was therefore determined by decisions 
made during the early 1940's. These constituted a crucial 
departure in American foreign policy: the United States 
having twice in less than thirty years become involved 
in European conflicts, it was no longer possible to argue 
that European affairs were of no concern to the United 
States. Rather, it was deemed necessary that the United 
States play an active part in European affairs so as to 
protect its interests and especially to prevent the out-
break of yet another catastrophic war. To the wartime 
leaders it was clear that changes in the nature of warfare 
and of international trade meant that the United States 
could no longer remain aloof from European develop-
ments. The rapid spread of conflicts throughout the 
world and the emergence of an interdependent world eco-
nomy, in which the United States' prosperity was tied to 
that of Europe, made this impossible. 
On this increasing willingness of the United States to 
assume a major role in international affairs was super-
imposed a growing disillusionment with the Soviet Union. 
As more and more of Eastern Europe came under Russian 
control, the original goal of preventing future outbreaks 
of armed conflict was supplemented and eventually over-
shadowed by that of stopping Soviet expansion into West-
ern Europe, whose continued independence was regarded 
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as vital to that of the United States itself. These goals are 
evident in the three basic tenets of postwar American 
policy in Europe. First, a strong and democratic western 
Europe is in the interests of the United States. Although 
it was not expected that European and American views 
would be identical on all issues, it was believed that their 
shared commitment to democratic ideals and their common 
concern about Soviet influence would be the basis of a 
fundamental community of interest. It was consequently 
desirable that western Europe be strong in order to with-
stand possible Communist aggression and to contribute to 
the might of what was to become the western alliance. 
Second, the creation of a united Europe was to be 
encouraged as a means of achieving this first objective. 
National obstacles to trade were regarded as inimical to 
the recovery and subsequent growth of the European 
economy, and only as an integrated unit could western 
Europe wield the political power that would end its 
dependence on the United States. Moreover, the existence 
of a united Europe would preclude future armed conflicts 
among its members, notably France and Germany; and, 
of course, the establishment of a United States of Europe 
had a certain emotional appeal. Third, the United States 
should sacrifice its short-term economic interests to the 
longer-range political goal. In the immediate postwar 
period, of course, the United States enjoyed a balance of 
payments surplus that would have minimised the difficulties 
caused by discrimination against American manufactures, 
but even after this situation changed the United States 
viewed the creation of a strong, united, democratic west-
ern Europe as justifying transient commercial losses. 
Moreover, it was assumed that these reductions in exports 
would be attenuated by the rapid economic expansion 
resulting from economic union. 
Although the containment of communism came to over-
shadow the other motives for American involvement in 
European affairs, United States policy towards western 
Europe since 1945 shows a remarkable constancy of pur-
pose and conduct. The concrete manifestations changed 
with circumstances and were adapted to particular situa-
tions, but the basic principles and tenets remained 
unaltered. 
Postwar recovery 
With the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the United States 
terminated the assistance to its allies that had been 
provided under the Lend-Lease Program. Aid for refugees 
continued to be available through the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and, for the 
occupied territories of Italy and Germany, through the 
military administrations, but the other western European 
countries were obliged to apply for loans. Yet even the 
$3,750 million loan to the United Kingdom failed to 
resolve the severe economic difficulties. The war had 
destroye? much of the industrial plant of western Europe, 
and agncultural production was down to a fraction of 
pre-war levels; consequently, manufactured goods were 
scarce and the limited supplies of food had to be rationed. 
Clearly the situation was ripe for exploitation by com-
munist agitators. But it would not have been enough to 
merely satisfy Europe's current requirements; rather, the 
reconstitution of European productive capacity was neces-
sary. 
The Marshall Plan responded to these twin needs. As 
advanced by Secretary of State Marshall in June 1947, it 
was to attempt to alleviate suffering and prevent starvation, 
to restore the economic health that would provide the best 
defence against communist subversion, and to revive 
national economies so that recurring assistance would not 
be necessary. Yet while the United States was to provide 
the major part of the aid, the administration of the Mar-
shall Plan was to be European and the aid provided was 
to be based on the request submitted by a European com-
mittee that co-ordinated the various national proposals. 
Further, cooperation among the European participants 
was made a precondition for American assistance: to 
facilitate the expansion of intra-European commerce, 
barriers to trade were reduced and organisations such as 
the European Payments Union and the OEEC established. 
The Marshall Plan may not have resulted in economic 
integration, but it did make the economic recovery of 
Europe possible and furnished one of the earliest oppor-
tunities for national governments to work together to 
solve common European problems. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was the military 
counterpart of the Marshall Plan. In response to the 
proposal of the five signatory states of the Brussels Pact 
(Britain, France, and the Benelux) to form a defensive 
alliance including the United States, the American govern-
ment supported the establishment of NATO in 1949, 
although it again insisted that the alliance be multilateral, 
rather than a series of bilateral commitments. While only 
a minority in the State Department subscribed to the 
'twin pillars' concept, in which the United States and 
Europe constituted two separate and equal bases on which 
the alliance was founded, there was an attempt to structure 
the organisation so that the United States and Europe 
could participate as equals. In practice, of course, the 
United States has predominated because of its prepon-
derant military strength; nevertheless, while recognising 
the importance of NATO as a symbol of American invol-
vement in and commitment to Europe, it has consistently 
been American policy to try to increase the role played by 
the European states, in terms of both decision-making and 
responsibilities. 
Steps towards European unity 
Despite the progress achieved towards European integra-
tion under the aegis of the United States and through the 
creation of such international organisations as OEEC and 
NATO, it was obvious that if European unity was to be 
attained, the initiative would have to be taken by the 
Europeans themselves. Thus, on May 9, 1950, Robert 
Schuman, then Foreign Minister of France, proposed the 
creation of a European Coal and Steel Community that 
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would pool the industries of the member countries under a 
single authority. Although statements issued by the United 
States were del1berately circumsl?ect to avoid the appear-
ance of pressunng European nat10ns it welcomed 'a most 
important development prompted by° the desire to further 
"a rapprochement between Germany and France and 
progress towards the economic integration of western 
Europe", objectives favoured by the United States Govern-
ment'.1 The Schuman Plan was not only gratifying evidence 
that the limited steps taken with American encouragement 
had borne fruit; it also constituted a great advance towards 
the two major goals of American policy. The establishment 
of such a community would make war between its members 
unthinkable and materially impossible and would facilitate 
German entry into the community of nations· moreover it 
se~med likely to engender further steps leading to Europ~an 
umon. 
Yet if the American policy towards the Schuman Plan 
1:1aY'. generally b~ described as discreet support, there were 
s1gmficant excep!Ions. The proposed ECSC was attacked by 
bot~ . c':mservatives a1;1d ~tee! _producers as dangerously 
sociahs!Ic, although this v1ewpomt found few adherents in 
the government. The plan's more ardent proponents tried 
to manreuvre the United States into taking a more open 
stand: when the United Kingdom decided against joining 
the ECSC, several members of Congress demanded that 
Marshall Aid funds to Britain be curtailed. Although there 
was considerable feeling that British membership was 
desirable both for Britain and for the ECSC, the American 
govern~ent wisely abstained from intervention. In contrast, 
the Umted States openly demonstrated its support for the 
Coal and Steel Community once it came into existence 
~y being one of ~he first nations to extend official recogni-
tion and by offermg an enormous loan, for which the sole 
justification was political approbation. 
That the Schuman Plan came to a successful conclusion 
reflected the general coincidence of American and European 
policies. The potentially disastrous consequences when these 
diverged were demonstrated by the history of the European 
Defence Community. With the outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950, the United States became increasingly concerned 
about troop strength in Europe, where it feared an 
attack would materialize. It became American policy there-
fore to press not only for the fulfilment of NATO quotas 
but also for the rearmament of western Germany. The 
spectre of a remilitarized Germany understandably disturbed 
many European governments, particularly that of France. 
As an alternative to the unilateral rearmament of Ger-
many, the French government proposed the creation of a 
European Defence Community, in which the members 
would jointly control all the forces. After prolonged nego-
tiations, the six members of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity signed a treaty establishing the EDC in May, 1952. 
The United States government was a strong overt 
advoc~te of the EDC, which it regarded as necessary for 
rearmmg Germany and completing the readmission of 
that country to the community of European nations. 
EDC also elicited American support because it would 
constitute a powerful military force counter-balancing the 
Soviet forces and would almost certainly necessitate further 
progress towards political unification. The efforts of the 
United States to promote the defence community were inten-
sified in 1953, indicating concern over the slow progress. 
and culminated in Secretary of State Dulles's blatant threat 
that an "agonizing reappraisal" of American commitments 
in Europe would be necessary if the treaty were not ratified. 
Whether such statements were counterproductive or, as 
appears most likely in the case of France, were simply not 
believed, the treaty failed to achieve ratification. Sub-
sequently, as the result of enormous American pressure, 
West Germany was admitted as a full member to NATO 
and the Western European Union (an expanded Brussels 
Pact), but the resort to coercion soured United States 
relations with France for several years thereafter. 
1 Dean ACHESON, Present at the Creation, London, Hamish 
Hamilton, pp. 385-386. 
The EEC and Euratom 
The proposals to establish the European Economic 
Community and Euratom were, in contrast, of European 
origin. The foreign ministers of the six members of the 
Coal and Steel Community, meeting in Messina in 1952, 
took the initiative to relaunch the integration movement. 
Throughout the negotiations among the six in Brussels the 
following year, the United States refrained from active 
involvement, although it indicated its general endorsement 
of the project. That progress towards European unification 
was once again being made elicited approval from 
Washington, but official statements were circumspect, both 
because of the unfortunate consequences of active inter-
vention in the case of the EDC and because of the vague 
nature of the initial proposals. The creation of a common 
market could constitute a big step forward on the road 
to political integration, but it could also result in the 
emergence of regional trading blocs, to which the United 
States-as the champion of a global, multilateral economic 
system-was opposed. The final American judgement 
would therefore have to depend on the balance between 
supranationalism and protectionism embodied in the EEC. 
Similarly, the creation of a common energy authority could 
contribute to the realisation of a united Europe, but it 
could also engender a dangerous proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in Europe. Once again, the American position 
would have to be determined by the nature of the pro-
posals presented by the Spaak Committee. 2 
After careful consideration, the United States endorsed 
the proposals of the Spaak Committee, although there 
was some apprehension about their potential for causing 
dislocations in US-European trade. Of much greater 
concern to American officials, however, was the fact that 
the EEC was to comprise only the six members of the 
Coal and Steel Community. The creation of the Common 
Market could therefore conceivably lead to the division 
of western Europe on economic grounds. And if these 
six were to proceed towards political union, this cleavage 
might be intensified and introduce a serious split. The 
restricted membership of the EEC caused particular dis-
quietude in the United States because it was generally 
believed that Britain, with its strong heritage of stable 
and democratic government, was an indispensable member 
of any European political community. The United King-
dom was, however, clearly unwilling to surrender its 
sovereignty in certain areas to the institutions of the 
Community as was demanded by the Treaties of Rome, 
and the United States was equally averse to applying any 
pressure. The dilemma facing the American government 
was tnerefore whether to encourage the Six to proceed 
wllhout Britam or to attempt to foster an agreement be-
tween the Six and the other European states that seemed 
almost certain to preclude political union for the foreseeable 
future. 
The United States was compelled to face this question 
when the Briti,h government proposed the creation of a 
free trade area encompassing all of western Europe, inside 
which the Six would proceed alone to economic union. 
The American reaction to the Maudling Plan was decidedly 
negative, for it would have created the very regional trad-
ing blocs to which the United States was opposed and 
would have caused significant trade dislocations without 
the mitigating benefits of progress towards political unio!l,. 
Moreover, it was all too likely that the plan would m 
practice destroy the EEC, as the incentives for its members 
to create an economic union would be greatly reduced. 
2 At a mci.:ting at Messina in June 1955, the foreign ministers _of 
the countries bdonging to the European Coal and Steel Comrnumty 
decided that future e!Iorts for the unification of Europe should be 
concentrated on the economic field. Two important plans emerged: that 
for Euratom, the European atomic energy pool, and that for a common 
market. A group of experts was appointed to determine. ways a~d me~ns 
of achit:ving these goals. M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the _Belgian Fc:m.:1g:1 ~!m-
ister, pre~ided over this intergovernmental cornmtttcc and its findings 
-the Spaak Report-were submitted to the foreign ministers on 
21st. April 1956. 'Rapport des chefs de ddegation aux Ministres des 
Affaircs Etrangcrcs', 135 pp., Brussels, 1956. 
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The six members of the ECSC therefore received firm 
American support in opposing the Maudling Plan and con-
sequently in establishing their common market. Alth?ugh 
the EEC's potential to economically divide the contment 
concerned the United States, it was indisputably a con-
tribution to the creation of a politically and economically 
united Europe that was after all the ultimate goal. More-
over the British interest in maintaining commercial 
ties 'with western Europe, as demonstrated by their desire 
for a free trade area, suggested that it was not entlfely 
inconceivable that the United Kingdom might one day join 
with the Six and hence end the split that became manifest 
with the formation of the European Free Trade Association 
by seven states unable to subscribe to the EEC. 
An enlarged Community 
Thus while the United States regarded the abandonment 
of progress towards political unification as too high a 
price to pay for British membership of the EEC, it felt 
that British participation was desirable as it would not 
only strengthen the Community, but it would end the 
division of western Europe into two economic blocs. Also, 
British membership was indispensable for the strong and 
united Europe President Kennedy envisaged in his "Grand 
Design": . 
··we believe that a united Europe will be capable of 
playing a greater role in the common defense, of respond~ 
ing more generously to the needs of poorer nat10ns, of 
joining with the United States and others m lowering tr~de 
barriers, resolving problems of currency and commodities, 
and developing coordinated policies in all other econorrnc, 
diplomatic, and political areas ... It would be premature,_ at 
this time to more than indicate the high regard with which 
we would view the formation of this partnership. The first 
order of business is for our European friends to go for-
ward in forming the more perfect union which will someday 
maKe it possible." 3 . . 
If theretore the Lnited States was determined to avoid 
the overt intervention that had produced such damaging 
results with the EDC, it nevertheless clearly supported and 
encouraged the 1961 British application for membership 
to the EEC on the terms of the Treaties of Rome. In addi-
tion to public and private indications of its endorsement 
of the bid, the United States dangled a material mcentlve 
before Europe: the Trade Expans10n Act of _1962 gave the 
President the authority to completely aboltsh tanffs on 
items where the United States and the EEC accounted 
for more than eighty per cent of the world's trade-an otier 
that would be meanmgful only if Great Britain were a 
member of the Community. 
The Umted States also tried to improve the chances of 
British admission by coming to the aid of Prime Mnuster 
Macm1ilan·s government, which was coming under heavy 
fire in December, 1%2, after the cancellat10n of _the iomt 
Anglo-American Skybolt project because of escalatmg costs. 
This threatened to deprive the United Kingdom of a credible 
nuclear deterrent. Although the British government mam-
tained that the United States was obliged under the terms 
of the agreement to provide an alternative weapons system, 
the American decision to furnish Britain with Polan~ war-
heads reflected primarily a sense of personal commitm~nt 
by the President and a fear that ,llould the Conservative 
government fall over this issue, the prospects for Bnt1sh 
entry would be dim. To de Gaulle, however, _the Nassau 
accord was the epitom.: of precisely that "special relat10n-
ship" between Britain and the United States that he assert-
ed was incompatibie with membership !11 the EEC. De,p1te 
the offer of identical assistance to the French, de Gaulle 
seized upon the agreement as the pretext for his veto of 
the British application in January, 1963. 
While de Gaulle's veto conclusively demonstrated that 
British membership in the EEC would not be a rea!tty 
during his term in office, it was hoped that the French 
a George M. TABER, John F. Kennedy and a Uniting Europe, 
Bruges, College of Europe, pp. 98-99. 
attitude might in time soften so that the enlargement of 
the Community might be possible. This optimistic assump-
tion and the realistic perception that little could be done 
to change de Gaulle's policies resulted in the emphasis in 
American policy shifting from the growth and development 
of the EEC to the relationship between the United State~ 
and the Community. With the p:,,,·age of time, the llnited 
States became increa,ingly dismayed by the lack of progress 
towards political union, espe~ially as the rncrifices it believ-
ed it was making came at a period of economic dilliculty. 
By the end of the 1960"s. the view of the European Com-
munity as a protectionist trading bloc. discriminating against 
American products and concluding preferential trade agree-
ments that kept American manufactures out of part of the 
developing world, was gaining currency. While this view 
seems exaggerated, it illustrates the magnitude of the changes 
that had occurred in ten vears. The EEC was now a reality. 
with its own interests, n·ot always identical with those of 
the United State,. Although American disillusionment 
,.vith the Community is to some extent responsible for the 
emergence of di,putes bet\\een the United States and the 
EEC, many of the conflicts merely signify that the Com-
munity as a distinct entity has now come of age. 
Relations between the United States and the EEC 
While reco['.nizing that the formation of the Common 
Market would entail certain economic sacrifices and accept-
ing these los,es as the price of achieving a united Europe, 
the United States has endeavoured to minimize these 
adver"e effects, particularly as progress towards political 
union slowed and the American balance of payments 
worsened. The creation of an economic union inev-
itably tends to both increase and divert trade as the 
removal of tariff barriers acts to stimulate commerce 
among the members while discouraging imports from third 
countries by making them relatively more expensive. The 
United States has therefore tried to reinforce the trade-
creating tendency by advocating the reduction and elim-
ination of intra-European obstacles to trade. This would 
not only strengthen the bonds between the members but 
also foster a dynamic economy, and ensure that growth 
did not occur at the expense of non-members. It has 
therefore encouraged the Community to adopt a liberal 
external trading policy so as to Jessen the trade-diverting 
effects caused by imports from outside being &,placed by 
competition from member states and so that the Common 
Market can contribute to the emergence of a truly multi-
lateral \\orld economy, rather than foster one dominated 
by regional trading blocs. Since the EEC has succeeded in 
removing most of the internal barriers to trade, the conflicts 
between the Community and the United States focus largely 
on the extent to which the former is following protectionist 
policies. 
According to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which embodies the principles governing commerce 
in most of the non-Communist world, the common set of 
tariffs adopted by a customs union must not on average 
be higher than those prevailing in the member states pre-
viously. Moreover, any non-member that can demonstrate 
that its t!·ade has been adversely affected by the formation 
of the union is entitled to compensation for its losses. 
Although the common external tariff of the EEC is in 
accordance with the first provision of GATT, the United 
States and other nations could nevertheless show that 
because, for example, German manufactures could now 
enter France duty-free. their own exports were suffering 
from relative discrimination. Consequently a substantial 
part of the Dillon Round of GATT talks in 1961-1962 was 
devoted to assessing the effects of the establishment of 
the EEC on trade patterns. In the event, the six members 
of the Common .IVIarket declined to make any appreciable 
compensation but did offer to reduce the level of the 
external tariff by twenty percent if the other members of 
GATT reciprocated. On the basis of this proposal. the 
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Dillon Round came to a mildly successful conclusion, but 
consideration of agricultural trade, which was the major 
preoccupation of the united States, was deferred. 
Since both the members of the European Community 
and the United States arc located in the temperate zone, 
it is an unfortunate fact that they grow essentially the same 
crops. Moreover, because of the political power of farming 
groups and the importance assigned to agriculture on both 
continents, the price of agricultural commodities and hence 
the incomes of farmers are maintained at artificially high 
levels by a series of quotas, levies, and other restrictions on 
imports that partialiy isolate the internal market. The level 
of protection ckpends on the efficiency of the domestic 
producers: while American prices are near to the world 
levels, those in Europe can be fifty to seventy-five percent 
higher, reflecting the relatively small size and obsolete 
methods typical of European farming. Although one of 
the main goals of the EEC's common agricultural policy 
is to promote the modernization and rationalization of 
European agriculture, its principal effect so far has been 
to guarantee high prices by means of a lloating levy impos-
ed on all imports of products covered by CAP. Since these 
items are precisely those grown in Europe and the United 
States, the result has been the partial exclusion of the 
cheaper American commodities and, in some cases, the 
accumulation of unwanted surpluses. 
The common agricultural policy has therefore become 
one of the main targets of American criticism. The United 
States maintains that CAP is an inherently protectionist 
system that has acted to preserve an inefficient activity 
and to restrict the volume of American agricultural exports 
to Europe. Although the EEC emphasizes that the amount 
of imports from the United States has grown steadily and 
its percentage in terms of total European consumption has 
remained constant, it is clear that the principal benefits 
from expanding consumer demand have gone to European 
producers. In addition, the subsidised sale of surpluses 
abroad has provoked repeated criticism from Washington 
and some members of the Community. Despite an attempt 
to achieve agreement on agricultural trade in the Kennedy 
Round of GATf negotiatiom, the common agricultural 
policy still remains a sore point in relaiions between the 
United States and the Community. 
Association agreements 
Whereas American opposition to the present common agri-
cultural policy, because of its protectionist elements, reflects 
the $150-200 million in potential exports it is estimated 
to have cost the United States, criticism of the Community's 
policy of association with non-European countries is based 
much more on fundamental principles. The members of 
the Common Market argue that the association agreements 
with African states were necessary to prevent the economic 
disruption of these countries, many of whom, as colonies, 
enjoyed preferential access to European markets, and that 
they serve to channel aid from the EEC. The United States, 
however, view•; these arrangements as fostering regional 
trading blocs: by creating a system of reciprocal preferences, 
they promote the development of exclusive commercial 
ties b~tween the African states and the Common Market 
members. This discriminates not only against the United 
States but also against other countries producing the same 
items as the associated states~the Latin American nations 
in particular, who in turn may be expected to put pressure 
on the United States to construct its own regional trading 
bloc in the western hemisphere. 
The United States objects to the association agreements, 
therefore, because they are incompatible with a multilateral 
world economy. Although it is dubious of the value of 
trade preferences in providing aid, the United States has 
indicated its willingness to accept such a system, provided 
that the donor abjures any reciprocal advantages and that 
the benefits are extended without discrimination to all 
eligible countries. American criticism of the association 
agreements consequently is directed at the particular method 
chosen rather than the attempt to provide assistance. Both 
the United States and Europe have in fact endorsed a global 
preference system, but pending its realisation, the European 
Community has refused to abandon its association agree-
ments and is concluding new ones with members of the 
British Commonwealth. The United States government has 
repeatedly expressed great concern about these develop-
ments, as it fears they may lead to the fragmentation of 
the world economy. 
By far the most contested set of issues between the 
United States and the European Community are those 
concerning trade and monetary affairs. The American po,i-
tions on these topics are not based on objections to the 
policies of the Common Market or the lines along which 
it is developing, as in the case of the disputes over the 
common agricultural policy and the association agreements; 
rather the differences of opinion about the commercial 
relations between t'1e two partners resemble traditional 
conflicts among individual states. That the participants are 
the United States and the EEC may mean that the stakes 
are higher and that solutions are somewhat more urgent, 
but essentially the negotiations are no different from 
normal diplomatic activity. 
The subjects involved, however, are extremely complex: 
as the level of tariff barriers between the United States and 
the EEC has been reduced, the major obstacles to trade 
have become "non-tariff barriers", such as national regu-
lations, procurement policies, and valuation procedures. 
Thus, the United States has repeatedly attacked protective 
devices like border taxes, while the Common Market 
has long called for the elimination of the American Selling 
Price system, a notorious obstacle to foreign chemical 
products. A major part of trade negotiations is, therefore, 
devoted to considering NTBs, but as it is very difficult to 
identify such impediments, let alone quantify their effects, 
progress has been disappointingly slow. 
The same situation predominates in monetary affairs, 
where the need for fundamental reform is accepted, but 
comensus on how to proceed is lacking. The United States 
wishes to introduce considerable flexibility into the fixing 
of exchange rates and has asserted that trade and military 
is<ues must be considered simultaneously. The members 
of the EEC, in contrast, have insisted that the United States 
restore the convertibility of the dollar into gold and return 
to a system of fixed exchange rates. Although the differ-
ences in position and the complex interrelationships between 
trade and monetary matters suggests that resolution of 
these issues will require long and difficult negotiations, 
the importance to both Europe and the United States of 
maintaining healthy economic relations indicates that tem-
porary compromises will furnish an interim solution to 
these problems. 
Conclusion 
The landmark decisions that determined the course of 
postwar United States policy towards Europe were made 
in the early 1940s, and thirty years later it is these same 
principles that still guide American action. Europe is still 
regarded as a region of vital importance to the United 
States, and one in which it is necessary that the United 
States play an active role. The United States believes today, 
as it did then, that a strong and democratic Europe is still 
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in the national interest, despite the changes that have 
occurred in the international political environment. In 
President Nixon's words: 
"America's and western Europe's interests are parallel 
in most areas of policy .... The United States has always 
supported the strengthening and enlargement of the Euro-
pean Community. We still do. We welcome cohesion in 
Europe became it makes Europe a sturdier pillar of 
peace .... We recognize that our interests will necessarily 
be affected by Europe's evolution and we may have to 
make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that 
the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is 
outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the West 
as a whole." 4 
But in the past thirty years dramatic changes have 
occurred in Europe, changes to which the policies of the 
United States contributed. These altered circumstances have 
necessitated changes in American policies as they continue 
to attempt to reach the same goal. As Europe has grown 
in economic power, the United States has encouraged her 
to assume the responsibilities, both in terms of decisions 
and commitments, commensurate with this development. 
"Twin pillars", "Atlantic Partnership", "Grand Design", 
and most recently "Nixon Doctrine" symbolize the attempts 
of successive administrations to persuade European nations 
that t'iey had: 
"The ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes 
which once might have required our intervention .... [The] 
central thesis [was] that the United States will participate 
in the defense and development of allies and friends, but 
that America cannot-and will not-conceive all the plans, 
design all the programs, execute all the decisions, and 
undertake all the defense of the free nations of the 
world." 5 
The frustrations produced when Europe failed to respond 
has engendered a sense of disillusionment with Europe, a 
feeling that was strengthened by the lack of progress to-
wards political union. To the more cynical, European 
integration has seemed to have served only to produce 
economic benefits, and as the United States experienced 
increasing balance of payments difficulties, it was inevitable 
that Europe be held to some extent re,ponsible. Now that 
the Common Market has been established as a going con-
cern, the United States has become increasingly pre-occu-
pied with its own interests. In some sense, this may mark 
the beginning of normal intergovernmental relations, with 
the habitual conflicts of national interest, but after almost 
two decades of commitment to the ideal of a united Europe 
and of identifying European interests with its own, this 
has been a difficult transition for the United States to 
make. The reevaluation of its policy towards Europe that 
the American government was to conduct during the "Year 
of Europe" reflects this perception that the interests of the 
United States and western Europe are no longer identical. 
But while it indicates that the American government believes 
that the changed circumstances in Europe necessitate a 
re-examination of American policy, it also demonstrates 
that the United States believes that it still has a vital interest 
in, crucial ties with, and an essential role to play in 
western Europe. 
4 Richard M. N1XON, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building 
for Peace. A Report to the Congress February 18, 1970, pp. 20-21. 
Richard M. N1xo,-;, US Foreign Policy for the 1970: A New Strategy 
for Peace, A Report to the Congress February 18, 1970, pp. 20-21. 
' N,xo,-;, A New Strategy for Peace, pp. 4-5. 

